What Uzbekistan should expect from Scholz

On September 15, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited Uzbekistan on an official trip. Stanislav Pritchin, who heads the Central Asia sector at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, shared his thoughts on the initial outcomes of the leaders’ meetings and the cooperation potential.

Proactive Focus

European nations like Germany and France are actively engaging with Central Asia. France has prioritized building relationships with the two largest Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, as demonstrated by President Emmanuel Macron‘s visits last year. Meanwhile, Germany is working to establish a more structured dialogue in the C5+ format, which has successfully fostered broader cooperation in the region for other countries and the European Union.

The format emphasises engagement with the states with the largest economies. This is evident from Chancellor Olaf Scholz‘s upcoming participation in the second summit, “Central Asia – Germany,” in Kazakhstan on September 17 and his recent two-day visit to Uzbekistan to explore cooperation opportunities.

Point-by-point Method

When we consider the agreements made during the visit, the outcomes still need to be improved despite Germany being a developed country and one of the world’s largest economies. Not many projects in Central Asia and Uzbekistan involve German capital. Additionally, no significant investment projects would drastically alter Uzbekistan’s economic framework. The primary emphasis of Uzbek-German relations is on specific service-oriented technological projects.

Undeniably, German technologies possess significant competitive advantages and have the potential to invigorate the development of the Uzbek economy. While the current initiatives may not radically transform the economic structure or establish a new financial model for Uzbekistan similar to the Russian-Uzbek or Chinese-Uzbek projects, they nonetheless represent significant collaborative efforts. It’s important to note that this visit appears to be aimed at fostering and strengthening potential cooperation, with the geographical factor and the relatively restrained engagement of German businesses in the region serving as the primary factors limiting the dynamic growth of the relationship.

Main direction

Of course, German companies, as well as Western investors in general, have a great interest in the natural resources of the Central Asian states. Both the United States and France are showing it. Above all, we are talking about critical minerals. This subject becomes especially important given the changing architecture of the post-colonial world and the lack of access to cheap resources in other parts of the world.

At the same time, Germany’s denuclearisation program is in full swing within the framework of nuclear power generation, so the Germans are unlikely to have any interest in Uzbek uranium. But the other minerals are naturally of great interest.

In terms of state migration policy, it’s crucial to establish an organised and systematic framework that enables Uzbek migrants to engage in targeted recruitment for work opportunities in Germany. It’s important to acknowledge language barriers, technological challenges, and varying standards, which means that the scope of labor migration may be relatively limited.

Sanctions and interests

Considering the Western countries’ emphasis on enforcing sanctions in all aspects of their engagement is essential. Although the scale of economic projects in Central Asian countries is limited, compliance with sanctions against the Russian Federation is a key priority for Central Asian states. This means that, at the insistence of the West, the region’s countries are expected to forego mutually beneficial and profitable joint projects with Russia. However, it would be more constructive for the West to offer compensation and alternative projects instead of simply calling for a reduction in cooperation with Russia. Initiatives to optimise transport routes or opportunities to purchase surplus goods that cannot be supplied to Russia could contribute to the economic development of the C5+ member states.